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MANIPULATION OF CRUDE OIL FUTURES
by
*Louis Phlips
European University Institute (Florence)
Abstract
This paper analyses the possibility of manipulating the 
crude oil futures contracts traded on the Brent 15-Day market and 
the London International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). It also makes 
an heroic attempt at assessing the actual occurrence of manipula­
tions. Two types of manipulation are distinguished: a "classic" 
manipulation, involving distortions at delivery, and an "oligopo­
listic" manipulation, which presupposes that oil extraction is 
under the control of a few producers.
It is argued that a) the Brent 15-Day market follows rules 
that make oligopolistic manipulation feasible and b) two succes­
sive changes in the IPE contract were needed to free it from the 
effects of delivery squeezes (to the detriment of the longs). How­
ever, these changes did not free the IPE from oligopolistic mani­
pulation .
Paper presented at the International Conference on Futures Mar­
kets in Melbourne, Australia, 10-12 December 1990. I am grateful 
to Barry Goss for most helpful suggestions. Alban Brindle, 
Stella Fitzgerald and Alister Harris of the IPE (London) provid­
ed data and answered many questions. Thanks are also due to 
Linda Edwards, Christopher Gilbert, Ronald Harstad, Peter 
M^llgaard, Jean-Marie Viaene, Basil Yamey and the participants 
at the Melbourne conference for critical comments on earlier 






















































































































































































This paper analyses the possibility of manipulating the 
crude oil futures contracts traded on the Brent 15-Day market and 
the London International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). It also makes 
an heroic attempt at assessing the actual occurrence of manipula­
tions. Two types are distinguished: a "classic" manipulation, in­
volving distortions at delivery, and an "oligopolistic" manipula­
tion, which presupposes that oil extraction is under the control 
of a few producers. The latter is an outgrowth of game-theoretic 
work on futures markets for natural resources when the correspond­
ing cash markets are oligopolistic. My main motivation is, there­
fore, to find out under which real life contract specifications 
this oligopolistic manipulation can occur.
There is a fast-growing theoretical literature on futures 
markets with monopolistic or oligopolistic cash markets. The basic 
intuition behind this literature is that, when producers face 
downward sloping demand curves, signing a futures contract leads 
to a shift in their marginal revenue curve. Taking up a long posi­
tion creates an incentive to cut down production. Conversely, when 
a producer takes a short position on the futures market for his 
product, it is in his interest to increase production (Anderson 
and Sundaresan, 1984). Many implications of this basic idea have 
been worked out for different types of commodities and market con­
stellations. Only results directly applicable to natural resources 
are relevant here. They can be found in a series of theoretical 
papers by Brianza et al. (1990), Harstad and Phlips (1990), and 
Phlips and Harstad (1990a and 1990b).
Section 1 gives a non-technical summary of the main assump­
tions and results obtained in this work, with special reference to 
the Phlips-Harstad (1990b) paper. These results provide the theo­
retical underpinning for the present institutional application. 
Section 2 clarifies the difference between oligopolistic and clas­
sic manipulation. Section 3 studies the Brent 15-Day market while 





























































































1.____ A Duopoly Model
Imagine the following duopoly game. Two risk-averse produ­
cers, company A and company B, control the extraction of a parti­
cular type of crude oil. They play a noncooperative Cournot game, 
that is, they determine independently their planned delivery poli­
cy over three months, t=l, t=2 and t=3. They do this by maximis­
ing, each, the sum of expected profits (over these three periods) 
in both the spot market and the corresponding futures market.
Each producer wishes to sell a given stock of crude oil over 
these three months. This stock is available under the ground (or 
the sea). This differentiates our approach from models with stocks 
that have to be produced. In a sense, the stocks are given by 
mother Nature. Exploration costs are sunk. To change the supply of 
crude on the market, the producers only have to modify the timing 
of the pumping and/or the loading. The cost of the pumping or the 
loading has to be borne sooner or later and is, therefore, irrele­
vant for our problem. Our producers' problem is, indeed, how to 
allocate their stock over the 3 months, that is, how much to pump 
or load in each month.
Carrying costs of oil stored above the ground are ignored to 
keep the model as simple as possible. This is a serious limita­
tion. It is particularly unfortunate in the case of crude oil, 
since loaded cargoes are part of the above-the-ground inventories. 
The purchase or sale of loaded cargoes is indeed a simple means of 
changing inventories. These inventory changes are not taken into 
account.
The game is a two-stage game, because producers A and B can 
simultaneously take positions on a futures market for the same 
type of crude. On that market, they trade among themselves and 
with a risk-neutral third playercalled speculator S. (Extending 
the model to several speculators would only add notational com­
plexity . )
In t=l, a futures contract for delivery in t=3 is introduced 




























































































three players an opportunity to close out their positions or to 
open new ones. In t=3, the positions still open are settled or 
delivery takes place at the then valid spot price p^.
The futures market is organized as an "open outcry" ex­
change, which functions according to the following simple rule: At 
the opening, all offers - which must be take-it-or-leave-it offers 
- are made simultaneously; then each player accepts or rejects the 
outstanding offers in a predetermined commitment order. Contracts 
are made pair-wise. In general, different trading pairs transact 
contracts at different prices. (There is no law of one price!)
Futures market activity results from differences in opinion 
about what the evolution of the demand for crude oil will be. Our 
model is thus 180 degrees away from the rational expectations ap­
proach: technically speaking, beliefs are "inconsistent" because 
drawn from different probability distributions. This inconsistency 
drives the model. It implies that each player believes in his be­
liefs and expects the other players to have to adjust their be­
liefs to his at t=l, when new information about market demand will 
become available.
Notice an important common knowledge assumption: All players 
can determine what the producers' equilibrium delivery plan is. In 
particular, if manipulation of the spot prices is implied, the 
speculator knows it. You might therefore expect the speculator 
will refuse to trade. This intuition turns out to be incorrect.
Oligopolistic manipulation
Let us first consider the equilibrium delivery policy of 
producers A and B, on the assumption that they were able to take a 
net long or net short position irt■the futures market (over its two 
sessions). They have stocks saQ and s^g, respectively, to be 
delivered over t=l, t=2 and t=3. The producers' problem (in t=l) 
is to determine the time shape of q^t (i=a,b), given the net 




























































































i's expected net short position at the end of t=2. In subgame 
perfect equilibrium
*il
- _ si0 _ 2 N.
qi2 3 9 9 (la)
qi3
si0 4 Ni 2 ^  
3 9 9 (lb)
when market demand is linear. If producer A has a net short posi­
tion {N >0) on the futures market, then A will pump (deliver) 
less in periods 1 and 2 and more in period 3 than in the absence 
of the futures market. If producer B is also net short, this coun­
teracts the intended reduction in A's deliveries in periods 1 and 
2 and the intended increase in period 3. The counteraction is less 
pronounced, however, so that total supply decreases in t=l and 
t=2, and increases in t=3.
Substitution of equations (1) into the (inverse) market 
demand equation gives the evolution of the market price:
^  O f)
Pi = P + "I <Na + Nb>
P2 = P + "I <Na + Nb>
p3 = ; _ if ,Na + Nb, .
A ip is the spot price in the absence of a futures market.
Equations (2) are an example of what we call "oligopolistic" 
manipulation. If the producers are net short, they have substitut­
ed known futures prices for uncertain spot prices, and are willing 
to let the futures price be low at maturity. For that purpose, 
they make sure the spot price is low at maturity, since at t=3 




1. p=a/8-(saO+sb0)/3B, where a>0 is the random intercept of





























































































are then to pump or deliver less in t=l and t = 2 and to pump or 
deliver more in t = 3. As a result, the spot price will be higher 
than in the absence of manipulation (i.e. than p) in t=l and t=2, 
and lower in t=3. If producers are net long, they will do the 
reverse and the spot price will decrease relatively more in the 
beginning of the life of a contract and increase relatively more 
at the end.
2The futures market
What is the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium on the futures 
market in t=l and t=2? First of all, trade in futures occurs in 
equilibrium, although equations (1) and (2) are common knowledge. 
Given inconsistent beliefs, the speculator's expected profit is 
such that he will sign futures contracts and will not drop out!
If the producers are not too risk averse, there will in fact 
be a rush to trade in t=l, when the contract is introduced: all 
contracts are signed in t=l. Otherwise, some contracts will be 
delayed until t=2.
The speculator is aware of the ongoing manipulation and has 
the opportunity to close out his positions in t=2. Nevertheless, 
he knowingly and willingly leaves his positions open until matur­
ity. Indeed, given the inconsistency in beliefs, the expected 
gains that led to futures trading remain. The producers do not 
modify their planned deliveries in t=2 and t=3 after t=2 demand is 
revealed. All players keep the positions arrived at in t=2 open. 
Although the assumptions made point to the contrary, the futures 
market is viable. 2
2. Formal proofs of the statements that follow can be found in 




























































































____ Classic Versus Oligopolistic Manipulation
In a case of "classic" manipulation, as described in the 
literature (see Gemmill, 1983, p. 307-315, and Easterbrook, 1986), 
the manipulator normally goes long. He builds up a large share of 
open interest and acquires a large fraction of the available stock 
to force the shorts, at delivery date, to pay a high spot price or 
to pay a premium in order to close out their position.
Short manipulations are said to be rare, because the shorts 
have to be able to tender the cash good for delivery and must 
therefore also incur the cost of carrying a large inventory in the 
cash commodity (see Edwards and Edwards, 1984). Again, in some oil 
markets life is much easier for the short manipulator. As we shall 
see in Section 4, all the Brent crude and the storage facilities 
are in the hands of a few companies who have no difficulty in 
squeezing longs who would want delivery of small lots of Brent 
oil. Easterbook1s conclusion that manipulation, whether long or 
short, is a costly operation and that the cost increases with the 
extent of the manipulation, does not apply to crude oil. As a 
consequence, it cannot be said to be a very rare phenomenon.
The "oligopolistic" manipulation defined by equations (1) 
and (2) differs from classic futures market manipulation in sever­
al ways. First, it is not a one-man operation but a manipulation 
carried out by several producers simultaneously and independently. 
No collusion is involved. The question may thus be raised whether 3
3. Kyle (1984) models a long squeeze where the manipulator takes 
advantage of the fact that not all stocks of the commodity 
are easily available for delivery on favorable terms. (There 
are different grades, for example.) The squeezer threatens to 
take delivery and thereby forces shorts to bail out at high 
prices to avoid the high costs of bringing supplies into 
deliverable position. Alternatively, the squeezer takes 
delivery of so much of the commodity that the shorts must 
deliver goods (grades) that would not ordinarily be cheapest 




























































































the word "manipulation" is not a misnomer, given that the strate­
gies involved are noncooperative. From an economic point o£ view, 
the noncooperative nature of the equilibrium is compatible with 
there being manipulation. It is, indeed, well known that noncoop­
erative games that are played repeatedly over time may lead to 
collusive outcomes. From a legal point of view, the three ingredi­
ents of "manipulation" as defined in U.S. law are present (Edwards 
and Edwards, 1984): a) "activities (...) are undertaken in a
manner calculated to produce artificial price effects"; b) the 
manipulators "have a market position dominant enough to permit a
conclusion that (they), in fact, could have caused the artificial
4price"; c) they intended to cause the price artificiality.
Second, classic manipulation can occur in an anonymous mar­
ket and may, in fact, require anonymity - see Kyle (1984). Oligo­
polistic manipulation cannot, since the number of producers must 
be small so that the identity of the big traders is known.
Third, oligopolistic manipulation does not imply distortions 
at delivery. In principle, no delivery squeezes or supply diffi­
culties are necessary.
Fourth, oligopolistic short manipulation is not more diffi­
cult than oligopolistic long manipulation. The two situations are 
symmetric: it is a matter of "pumping" more in certain periods and 
less in other periods, that is, of shifting deliveries forwards 
and backwards in time.
Finally, classic manipulation occurs at the end of a con­
tract: it is a matter of driving the futures price up or down at 
the close of trading day. It exists "only for a very short period 
of time - for as little as a few minutes or perhaps a few days" 
(Edwards and Edwards, p. 343). Oligopolistic manipulation affects 4
4. The objection that substitutability of different crude oil 
grades from other production fields limits the market power 
of Brent oil producers is not valid. The Brent price became 





























































































the entire time shape of the prices during the life of a futures 
contract.
3_.____ The Brent 15-Day Crude Oil Market^
The Brent 15-Day crude oil market corresponds as closely as 
one can hope for to the assumptions made in the theoretical model 
of Section 1.
Brent blend is a rather well-defined sweet crude oil (around 
38° API gravity) produced in the North Sea area by a small number 
of producers. Although it is a mixture of oils coming from differ­
ent North Sea fields, it may be considered as a "homogeneous" pro­
duct, so that the assumption of Cournot strategies is appropriate. 
Brent production is oligopolistic: it involves all major oil com­
panies, with Esso accounting for about one half of the total. It 
is collected by a pipeline system with discharges into tank at 
Sullom Voe on Shetland. Normally about 40 vessels a month can be 
loaded.
Since 1983, the so-called Brent 15-Day Forward Market trades 
relatively standardised contracts. Today, a 500,000 barrels cargo 
load is the basic trading unit. The role of the "speculator" is 
played by specialised trading companies,** a number of which are 
Wall Street houses (with Phibro among the prominent ones). There 
are no "locals", that is, speculators who do not trade in oil. The 56
5. The best (and possibly only)''reference book on the Brent 15- 
Day market is by Mabro et al. (1986). Its origins and evolu­
tion are well described by Sas (1987a, p. 110-116).
6. These traders are not likely to be risk neutral. In the theo­
retical model, the speculator is risk neutral, to simplify 
the algebra. Making him risk averse would not change the pre­




























































































big players know each other's forward positions.^
There is no centralised "open outcry" exchange, admittedly. 
Yet, the assumption of simultaneous announcements of take-it-or- 
leave-it offers, followed by binding pair-wise commitments, may be 
a good approximation of negotiations made during any particular 
trading day, given today's sophisticated telecommunications sys­
tems. In general, contracts are concluded at different prices 
during the day, for which estimates are reported every day by the 
specialised press (Platt's Oilqram is particularly useful). The 
Brent index, published daily by the IPE, is an average over the 
day of forward prices, in US dollars per barrel, on the Brent 15- 
Day market, as reported in the oil trade media.
Differences in opinion, leading to inconsistent beliefs not 
linked to available information, drive the theoretical model. Such 
differences also explain, as noted by Bacon (1986), the growth and 
the fluctuation in the number of forward deals, which are clearly 
not related to the amounts of physical trading in Brent crude oil. 
As a result, expectations are certainly not rational and the 
market cannot be said to be efficient. Mabro et al. (1985, p. 211) 
write:
"If the market were being used solely for hedging then the 
price for a deal (say) one month ahead should represent the 
best guess available of what the future will bring as it 
should encapsulate all the information currently available 
about the future. In particular the (say) one-month price 
should be a better prediction of the actual outcome of 
prices in a month's time than any other price currently 
available, and no other variable should be able to improve 
its performance. (...) The results of our statistical ana­
lysis show the opposite effect. Although this month's for­
ward price does predict next month's spot price fairly well, 
its performance is significantly improved by adding this 
month's spot price. Furthermore this month's spot price 
alone predicts next month's spot price well, and this 
month's forward price adds nothing significant to the rela­
tionship. This strong result indicates that the trading 
forward in Brent is not primarily genuine hedging in which 7
7. Petroleum Argus keeps confidential detailed records of con­
cluded contracts, with the names of the buyers and sellers in 




























































































the actual price in a month's time is the crucial magni­
tude . "
Since the Brent 15-Day market's organisational set-up fits 
the structure of the game described in Section 1, I conclude that 
the existence of such a market is beneficial to all players 
involved. Final consumers benefit from the shift of sales over 
time from a spot market with a higher present price to a lower- 
priced spot market (see equations (1) and (2)). Given their 
beliefs, producers and speculators are on their contract curves 
and thus satisfied with the working of the market. In particular, 
producers who maximise profits over the spot market and the 
futures market take non-zero positions on the futures market. This 
implies that the existence of such a futures market enables non­
colluding oligopolists to increase their profits as compared with
g
a situation without that market.
However, the 15-Day contract terms are very special - so 
special that one may wonder whether this is a futures market at 
all and ask what are the reasons for these particular features.
To begin with, contrary to what one might expect, contracts 
are not 15 days forward: as in most futures markets, they are for 
delivery in some future month, generally up to four months ahead. 
Why then talk about "15-day" contracts (or "15-day" prices or car­
goes)? To understand this, consider Figure 1. 8
8. Equations (1) show that if a particular producer i did not 
trade on the futures market, that is, if N^=0, he would 
nevertheless benefit from its existence, since he would shift 
some of his sales to the higher-priced periods 1 and 2 (be­
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July August September October
Figure 1. Brent 15-Day Forward Market
I am an oil trader and have to deliver a cargo load of Brent 
sometime in October. To hedge this cargo, I go in the "paper" mar­
ket to find another trader from whom I buy an October contract. A 
producer will, 15 days prior to the last day of the month preced­
ing the delivery month, i.e. on 15 September, by 5 p.m. London 
time, determine the "loading range" on the contract. The loading 
range is a period of 3 days in October (in this example) during 
which the cargo has to be loaded at Sullom Voe. 15 September is 
the earliest date on which the loading range can be fixed, since 
it is the day at which the loading programme at the Brent terminal 9
9. If the 15th is not a trading day, then the first preceding 
day is chosen. The buyers can refuse the first loading range 




























































































at Sullom Voe is organised (by Shell UK on behalf of the Brent 
system participants).
The producer comes in because some traders will buy from him 
at some point in time. So when I buy a contract, I may enter a 
chain of contracts, called a "daisy chain". In fact, more than 
hundred contracts may be in such a chain. The producer communi­
cates the October loading range to those with whom he traded. Each 
participant must pass on the notice to his trading partner, down 
the chain, at least 15 days prior to the first day of the loading 
range until somebody takes the "dated" (or "wet") cargo. (A cargo 
is "dated" as soon as its loading range is fixed. The Brent "dat­
ed" price thus corresponds to what the theoretical model calls the 
spot price pg.) Of course, I do not have to keep my contract: I 
can close out, if I can find another trader (or participants in a 
"loop" in the chain in which I am involved more than once) willing 
to cancel mutual obligations. There is, then, a cash settlement. 
Dated cargoes continue to be traded (even after they are loaded) 
until they reach the final point of destination. Two markets thus 
operate simultaneously: the market for dated and the market for 
undated cargoes (also called "15-day" cargoes). The dated price of 
a cargo that is actually loaded is to be paid in full within 30 
days of the Bill of Lading date.
It is clear that the functioning of this market relies on 
the performance of the individual players. "There are no rules and 
regulations of an exchange, no clearing house, no margins, no 
automatic ability to match out and discharge obligations." (Sas, 
1987a, p. 118.) (In theory, Britain's Association of Futures 
Brokers and Dealers regulates Brent trading. In practice, its 
oversight is minimal.) Breakdowns of the chains do occur. Yet, I 
would not conclude that this is not a futures market. According to 
American law and practice, it probably is not - although one 
American judge10 opines that it i's subject to U.S. commodities
10. Judge D.J. Conner, of the U.S. District Court in the Southern 
District of New York, in the Transnor versus affiliates of 
BP, Consco, Exxon and Shell case. His opinion and order was 




























































































exchange law (from which forward trading is exempted) because of 
its relatively standardised contracts and the high levels of 
speculation and performance without delivery. I am ready to argue 
that it is a (rather imperfectly organised) futures market for 
these reasons.
Why then are the 15-day contract terms so special? Their 
complexity is surprising as such, since business men in general 
prefer simplicity to complexity. Let us put the most striking 
particular features together: a) Producers have the so-called 
"time option": they determine the date of loading; b) There is no 
so-called "delivery option": all liftings are to be made at Sullom 
Voe (Rotterdam, for example, is not an alternative point of load­
ing); c) There is no "grade option": Brent (or more recently a 
particular blend of Brent and Ninian) is the grade to be deliv­
ered; d) After delivery (in the traditional sense) is made, that 
is, after a cargo is lifted at Sullom Voe, trade continues until 
the final point of destination is reached; e) The market is 
called "forward" to make sure that it remains unregulated.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
entered on April 18, 1990 in Transnor (Bermuda) Limited v. BP 
North America Petroleum, et al., 86 Civ. 1493 (WCC)
(S.D.N.T.). On this case, see my comments on Figure 5. On 
September 19, 1990, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
approved, by a 3-1 vote, a statutary interpretation making 
clear its view that 15-Day Brent oil contracts are not 
futures contracts as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act, 
but, instead, are sales of cash commodities for deferred 
shipment or delivery. As such, these contracts are excluded 
from the CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction. Commissioner Fowler 
West dissented on the grounds that "Broadening the applica­
bility of the forward contract exclusion to include transac­
tions by traders who are speculators, who are not contemplat­
ing delivery, who are using generally standardized contracts, 
who routinely offset their positions and who do not use the 





























































































In regulated futures markets, the time option is given to 
the shorts to protect them against a squeeze by the longs: the 
option gives them time to find the physicals (they have to deliv­
er) somewhere on the spot market. Here we have a perverse situa­
tion such that the manipulators (the producers) can force a buyer 
to load at a point in time that is not convenient to the latter. 
Given the market power of the producers, there is no point in 
giving them a delivery or a grade option. (In this market, it is 
the buyer who needs to be given such options, however paradoxical 
this may seem from the traditional point of view.) By buying 
loaded cargoes, the shorts can increase their stocks at sea and 
thus push the dated price up. From all this, I cannot but conclude 
that the specific 15-day contract specifications serve one 
purpose: to improve the feasibility of oligopolistic manipulation 
and act as a "smoke screen" to distract the attention of 
regulatory authorities.
It remains to show in detail how oligopolistic manipulation 
works in practice on the Brent 15-Day market. Take an October con­
tract. How can producers manipulate it? Suppose the majors build 
up a net short position in July (t=l) for October contracts. It is 
in their interest to buy these back at lower prices (relative to 
the basic market trend) in September. In the theory summarized in 
Section 1, they would, in equilibrium, "pump more" or "deliver 
more" in t=3, to "increase total supply in the spot market". How 
does this translate in the Brent market?
The translation has to take three simplifying assumptions of 
the model into account. First, the equilibrium quantities and 
prices are deviations from a horizontal trend and reflect the net 
impact of futures trading only. Fluctuations in basic market con­
ditions are thus assumed away. Second, the model assumes the basis 
is zero at maturity. Third, sales are instantaneous so .that the 
spot price is for immediate delivery. Hence the conclusion that 
the spot price has to go down in order to lower the futures price 
at maturity and that more has to be pumped to that effect.
When these assumptions are relaxed, one has to recognise 




























































































to close out before maturity or to change from long to short or 
vice-versa. (The model only demonstrates that manipulation as such 
is not a sufficient reason for the speculator to drop out.) Sec­
ond, one must allow for the possibility that the basis is not zero 
at maturity. Third, in the Brent 15-Day market, the spot price is 
the dated price.
The reinterpretation of the model is then as follows. "Get­
ting p3 down in t=3" is to be translated as bidding the forward 
premium down or bidding the spot premium up, relative to the mar­
ket trend. This implies bidding the Brent forward price for an 
undated cargo down before closing out a short position near matur­
ity. However, the dated price does not have to follow: it is in 
the producers' interest to simultaneously bid the price of dated 
cargoes up near maturity. Then producers win on both the market 
for undated cargoes and the market for dated cargoes. Consider an 
October undated contract and suppose there is backwardation. Short 
producers simultaneously bid this contract down before closing out 
on the 15th of September. To bid the dated September cargoes up, 
they have different possibilities. They can not only reduce the 
number of contracts dated in August but also buy these contracts 
back after they are dated.'1'’1' In addition, they can, in August, fix 
the loading range for a particular cargo anywhere in September, 
and thus influence the willingness to pay of a particular trader. 
This possibility is limited, admittedly, by the loading capacity 
at Sullom Voe: some scattering of the loading ranges over the 
delivery month is unavoidable. Yet, the less cargoes are dated in 
a given month, the more loading ranges can be allocated over the 
month at the producers' discretion. All in all, the limited flexi­
bility of the production schedule at Sullom Voe makes it likely 
that manipulation mainly works through the purchase of dated car­
goes .
An intertemporally consistent manipulation of the October 
contract would imply bidding the spot premium down (or the forward 
premium up) in July and August, with a concomitant increase in the 
sales of dated cargoes by producers and an increase in the number




























































































of dated cargoes available in those months (and an automatically 
increased scattering of the loading ranges). However, the loading 
capacity at Sullom Voe puts an upper limit to the number of car­
goes that can be dated. In addition, intertemporal consistency is 
perhaps too much to ask for and consistent behaviour is difficult 
to trace when the market trend changes. At any rate, an analysis 
of the evolution of the basis near maturity should be revealing.
Figure 2 illustrates what looks like the sort of manipula­
tion described above for the October 1990 contract. The market 
situation changed drastically the day Kuwait was invaded: that 
day, backwardation started. The spot premium fluctuated around 
% 1.50 until the first week of September and then jumped to above 
two dollars. The number of dated cargoes was much smaller than 






























































































































































































































































































































The crash of January 1986, due to an OPEC price war, pro­
vides a case where the market evolution was the opposite of the 
one illustrated in Figure 2. It is the more interesting as an
American trader, Transnor, accused affiliates of BP, Conoco, Exxon
12and Shell of conspiring together to bring the market down. In 
December 1985, Transnor purchased two 600,000-barrel cargoes on 
the Brent market, at an average price of # 24.50 a barrel for de­
livery in March 1986. By that time, a barrel cost as little as 
#13. Transnor refused to take delivery and sued the four oil com­
panies. Shortly afterwards its oil-trading operations went bust.
Figure 4 represents the evolution of the forward and the 
dated price of the March 1986 Brent contract. Producers cannot be 
held responsible for the price fall. But it is difficult not to 
hold them responsible for the drastic increase in the spot premium 
in the first week of February 1986 (to above two dollars). Compare 
with Figure 5, which refers to the March 1986 contract for West 
Texas Intermediate on the NYMEX. During the week preceding the end 
of trading day (20 February) the forward premium nicely tended to 
zero.
The left-hand side of Figure 6 gives an overview of the 
evolution of the basis on the Brent 15-Day market, since January 
1988, during the month preceding the delivery month. There was 
backwardation on the February 1988 contract, the whole of 1989 and 
the contracts for January, February, March, September and October 
1990 delivery. The spot premia were of at least one dollar for 10 
contracts. There was a contango (positive forward premium) during 
the whole of 1988 and then for the April till August 1990 deliver­
ies. However, these forward premia were much smaller (always less 
than one dollar). Perhaps one should conclude that, if there is 
oligopolistic manipulation on the Brent 15-Day market, it is typi­
cally a short manipulation.
12. in order to reduce their tax liabilities on North Sea pro­
fits. See the Weekly Petroleum Argus, XX, 17 of 30th April, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Implicit in what precedes is the idea that non-vanishing 
premia near the end of a contract indicate manipulation. Othei 
wise, indeed, forward and spot premia should converge to zer< 
because of arbitrage. Normally, this arbitrage should work as fol­
lows. In case of backwardation, the longs do not close out, accept 
delivery and sell immediately in the spot market. The spot price 
is thus pushed down. When there is contango, the shorts do not 
close out, tender for delivery and purchase on the spot market, sc 
that the spot price goes up.
On the Brent 15-Day market the producers can prevent this 
sort of arbitrage. Take a case of backwardation: the longs are
those who bought an undated cargo at a low (forward) price. They 
do not cancel obligations with their trading partners but keep the 
cargo once it is dated. (This corresponds to "accepting deliv­
ery".) However, if they were to sell this dated cargo, this would 
not push the dated price down to the extent :bat producers buy 
this cargo back1 .̂ Take the opposite case of a contango: the
shorts have sold an undated cargo at a high (forward) price and 
simply refuse to cancel undated contracts. Down rhe daisy chain, 
some buyer must accept to load. If the shorts are producers, they 
have the oil (under the ground or in tanks at Sullom Voe) and do 
not have to purchase it: the dated price is not pushed up.
All in all, arbitrage does not make the forward and the
dated price on the Brent 15-Day market equal to the extent that
the producers buy dated cargoes back in case of backwardation, and 
refuse a price settlement in case of contango. Data on individual 
contracts and price settlements are confidential, so that it is 
not possible to know the number of dated cargoes bought back by
producers nor the number of refusals to cancel out. All I can
13. When loaded, such a cargo is an increase in the producers' 
stock at sea. This stock can be resold at any time until the 
cargo reaches its final destination. I am unable to analytic­
ally explain the producers' intertemporal profit-maximising 















































































































































































































provide (see Figure 7) is the number of cargoes lifted per month 
and the corresponding total number of barrels lifted. If, in a 
case of backwardation, these numbers go down, then a strong case 
for the existence of oligopo-listic manipulation can be made. This 
is exactly what happened in August and September 1990 for the 
number of barrels loaded at Sullom Voe. The quantity of Brent oil 
lifted over 1989 and 1990 was never as low as during the two 
months following the invasion of Kuwait (except for the month of 
May 1989). In September 1990, the number of dated cargoes also 
went down. Allegedly, this was the result of a series of strikes 
and urgent maintenance work...
4_.____ The International Petroleum Exchange
14The London IPE is a formal, well-organised futures ex­
change with a fully standardised contract based on the Brent 15- 
Day market. It is thus a futures market on top of a futures mar­
ket! In order to survive, it had to change its contract specifica­
tions several times. These changes reflect its efforts to cope 
with the manipulations on the Brent market and to neutralise their 
effects. There were three successive contracts.
The original (Brent-1) contract
The essential specifications were similar to those found in 
most futures markets for storable commodities and did not take 
full account of the peculiarities of the Brent market. In order to 
attract speculators (other than oil traders), the basic trading 
unit (lot) was fixed at 1,000 barrels. (Remember that the trading 
unit is one cargo load of 500.000 barrels on the Brent 15-Day 
market.) The contract was scheduled to cover the six consecutive 
months following the current month.




























































































Delivery could take place in three ways: 1) in Rotterdam-
Amsterdam areas FOB ship, or into tank or pipeline at buyer's 
option; 2) by in-tank transfer (that is, by transfer in the books 
of the installation operator without movement of the oil) for 
deliveries of less than 50 lots; 3) by agreement between buyer 
and seller in the month prior to the delivery month, enabling any 
location or crude to be used at agreed discounts or premiums. 
Trading in a particular contract ceased at 12 hours on the last 
business day of the month prior to the delivery month. This last 
trading day was also the tender day (tenders to be lodged between 
12 and 4 p.m.)
This contract was introduced in 1983 and failed. It was re­
launched in October 1985 and failed again. Why? Cargo loads were 
not traded, because the majors and large traders did not see the 
need for a formal exchange nor the need for a delivery point other 
than Sullom Voe. Only small lots were traded and these were prone 
to delivery squeezes. Indeed, at Rotterdam-Amsterdam all the Brent 
crude is in the hands of the majors and the storage installations
belong the very few companies. If the longs were to demand deliv- 
-  15ery, they were certain to be asked to pay a premium.
The (Brent-2) contract
The only way out was to abandon delivery altogether. This 
was done in the (Brent-2) contract launched at the end of 1985. 
Delivery was replaced by cash settlement through a Clearing House. 
The last trading day was put on the lOth-last calendar day of the 
month prior to the delivery month. (For the October contract, this 
is the 20th of September.) The settlement price was the average of 
the Brent index over the last 5 days of the futures contract.
The pamphlet describing the'contract emphasized that "cash 
settlement eliminates the risk of a delivery squeeze". This state­
ment is correct in so far as it refers to the delivery squeezes of
15. This is a particular type of manipulation of the delivery 




























































































small lots at Rotterdam just described. Notice, however, that the 
5-day average of the Brent index covers days during which Brent 
cargoes to be delivered the following month are "dated". The set­
tlement price for an October contract was thus based on forward 
and dated prices. The fact of taking a 5-day average created addi­
tional confusion. It is not surprising, therefore, that trade re­
mained very low and was for small quantities (up to 200-300 lots) 
only. Something remained to be done.
The (Brent-3) contract
The obvious solution was to abandon the average settlement 
price and to get the last trading day out of the two weeks period 
of "dated" prices. The (Brent-3) contract - often called the 
(Brent-2 1/2) contract - did precisely that: as of 23 June 1988, 
the settlement price was defined as the published Brent index on 
the last trading day, and the last trading day was defined as the 
10th calendar day of the month prior to the contract month. For 
the October contract, this is the 10th of September.1®
The question arises whether these changes protect the IPE 
contract against oligopolistic manipulation. It is true that what­
ever happens on the Brent 15-Day market during the second half of 
September has no effect on the new settlement price. Furthermore, 
trade developed on the IPE and big traders became active. Yet, the 
big players are the same on both markets and their identity can be 
surmised in many transactions on the IPE as suggested by the fol­
lowing quotation from the Oil Buyers Guide of 5 September 1988: 
"Though prices are called out on the exchange, experts say that 
the IPE Brent is functioning more like a formalized cash brokerage 
system than a dynamic NY-style futures market. The lack of "lo­
cals" on the floor means that most bids or offerings will not
16. It is not clear why the 10th of the month preceding the de­
livery month was chosen rather than any other day before the 
beginning of the "dated" period. At the day of writing, the 
end of trading day was moved again, but forward in time, un­




























































































elicit the instant open-market response typical of the NYMEX. In 
this slower moving environment it is often possible for observers 
to surmise the identity of participants in many transactions". On 
the other hand, the Brent 15-Day price for undated barrels plays 
the role of a spot price on the IPE. The big players therefore can 
fairly well predict what is going to happen to this price as matu­
rity approaches when they manipulate the Brent 15-Day market. If 
they go short on the Brent 15-Day market, they can simultaneously 
go long on the IPE. A forward premium on the IPE as a contract 
gets close to maturity is then called for. Figure 9 is compatible 
with this intuition.
The right hand side of Figure 6 (in Section 3) gives an 
overview of the evolution of the forward premium on the current 
(Brent-3) contract during the month preceding the delivery month. 
This evolution is compatible with the interpretation just given: a 
positive forward premium (contango) appears on the IPE in the 
months where there is backwardation on the Brent 15-Day market and 
vice-versa. As one goes down the Figure (backwards in time), the 
premia on the IPE become smaller and smaller, however. Apparently, 
a learning process was in operation with the passage of time as 


























































































































































































Game-theoretic work on futures trading when the underlying 
cash market for a natural resource is oligopolistic provides the 
theoretical underpinning for the present paper. Non-cooperating 
duopolists who take a futures position were found to determine 
their equilibrium sales (or extraction) policy over time in such a 
way that the time shape of the prices is manipulated. For lack of 
a better term, this is called "oligopolistic" manipulation. The 
main motivation of the paper is to find real life contract speci­
fications under which such oligopolistic manipulation can and does 
occur.
It is argued that the Brent 15-Day market operates under 
conditions that are very close to the assumptions made in the 
game-theoretic model and allow the producers of Brent crude to 
manipulate the basis in their favour near maturity. It is further 
argued that the successive changes in the IPE contracts did free 
the IPE from delivery squeezes but not from oligopolistic manipu­
lation. The evolution of the forward premia near maturity is 
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